We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, midyear losers tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers in order to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and midyear losers increase risk in order to catch up with the midyear winners.
they face. In making their investment decisions, fund managers face two main incentives. First, they want to earn high compensation. Second, they do not want to be laid off. We examine how these incentives, which we term 'compensation incentives' and 'employment incentives', respectively, determine the fund managers' risk taking behavior. We show that it depends on the interim performance achieved by the fund managers: our results suggest that compensation incentives lead interim losers to increase their risk relative to interim winners and employment incentives lead interim losers to decrease their risk relative to interim winners.
We will first discuss incentives for losers, before turning to a description of the incentives for winners. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) exclusively focus on implicit compensation incentives that arise due to the positive convex relationship between the inflow of new money into the fund and its past performance (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998) . 1 As a fund manager's compensation depends on her assets under management (Khorana, 1996) , she will try to reach a top position by the end of the year. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) argue that this leads to yearly tournaments in which midyear losers increase their risk in the second part of the year. The intuition for this is that midyear losers have not much to lose from a further deterioration of their position in terms of inflows and eventually income, while increasing risk increases their chance of catching up with the midyear winners. However, in addition to the compensation incentives examined in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) midyear losers are also concerned about not loosing their job. This would entail significant costs in terms of foregone income, loss in reputation and the loss of future job opportunities. The probability of forced turnover is much higher for fund managers with poor past performance, i.e., midyear losers face a serious threat of being laid off (Khorana, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Hu, Hall and Harvery, 2000) . 2 If midyear losers follow risky strategies in the second part of the year, this increases their risk of achieving a performance outcome that is so bad that it would eventually trigger job loss (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998) . Consequently, employment incentives cause midyear losers to decrease their risk.
3
The incentives for midyear winners are markedly different. On the one hand, compensation incentives lead them to try to lock in their leading position and to play it safe rather than to increase their risk. On the other hand, employment incentives are of little or no relevance for midyear winners. They face no serious threat of dismissal.
Thus, unlike midyear losers, they have no reason to change their risk due to employment incentives.
Our analysis so far shows that employment incentives and compensation incentives are diametrical in that they lead to opposing hypotheses regarding managerial risk taking: Compensation incentives should lead midyear losers to increase their risk relative to midyear winners and employment incentives should lead midyear losers to 2 There is also a large body of empirical research showing a negative relationship between performance and termination risk for industrial companies (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Gilson, 1989; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) . 3 For fund managers with extremely bad performance after the first half of the year, there might also be an incentive to 'gamble for resurrection' (Hu, Kale and Subramaniam, 2005) . However, the 'gamble for resurrection' argument is only strong if fund managers are myopic, i.e., if they do not take into account their chance of finding a new job after being laid off. If they are not myopic, they are less inclined to gamble for resurrection, because this increases the likelihood of a catastrophic performance (entailing a complete destruction of the manager's reputation) and eventually of never finding a new job in the industry again. In order not to complicate the analysis, we refrain from including such extreme incentives.
decrease their risk relative to midyear winners. The relative strength of employment incentives and compensation incentives depends on the expected costs of job loss as well as on the expected increase in compensation due to reaching a top position. We suggest using market returns as a simple proxy for the relative strength of these two incentives. We think this is a reasonable proxy for the following reason: following bear markets the flows that can be captured by reaching a top position are relatively low because aggregate inflows into funds are generally low (e.g., Warther, 1995) .
Thus, compensation incentives are weak. Furthermore, low aggregate inflows eventually lead to many fund closures (Zhao, 2005) . Therefore, the threat that the fund manager's fund will be closed and she will lose her job is severe in bear markets. At the same time, fewer new funds are started (Zhao, 2002 ) and a fund manager might face difficulties in finding a new job in the fund industry if she actually loses her job.
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Following this line of reasoning, we expect employment incentives to be strong in bear markets, while compensation incentives are relatively weak. In contrast, aggregate flows into the market are high after bullish markets. Consequently, compensation incentives are strong in this case. Furthermore, there are also only very few fund closures and a lot of new fund openings following bull markets (Zhao, 2002 and 2005) so that the threat of dismissal is not severe. Therefore, employment incentives are relatively weak in this case, while compensation incentives are strong.
From this analysis, we conclude that it is more likely that compensation incentives dominate in bull markets, while employment incentives are more likely to dominate in bear markets. Furthermore, we expect that the more bullish (bearish) the markets are, 4 There is also some empirical evidence from the corporate sector that shows that being displaced in recessions leads to particularly large permanent income losses (e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Krebs, 2006) . the more pronounced is the impact of the compensation (employment) incentive.
Thus, our main hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: In bull markets midyear losers increase fund risk more than midyear winners do.
Hypothesis 2: In bear markets midyear losers increase fund risk less than midyear winners do.
Hypothesis 3: The more bullish (bearish) the markets are, the more (less) midyear losers increase fund risk relative to midyear winners.
We use portfolio holdings data of US equity mutual funds over the period 1980 to 2003 to test our hypotheses. Using holdings data instead of return data allows us to capture the intended risk taking strategies of fund managers rather than the realized ones which might be partly driven by unexpected changes in stock risk.
Our results support all three hypotheses. In bull markets midyear losers increase risk more than midyear winners do. In bear markets midyear losers increase risk less than midyear winners do. Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the general literature on managerial risk taking in response to compensation incentives (e.g., Cohen, Hall and Viceira, 2000; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006) . For the mutual fund industry, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) provide empirical evidence that managers respond to implicit compensation incentives that arise due to the convex performance flow relationship. This finding is confirmed in several follow-up studies like Koski and Pontiff (1999) , Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) , Qiu (2003) , Hu, Kale and Subramaniam (2005) , and Pagani (2006) . However, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) , and Kempf and Ruenzi (2002) We consider funds that belong to the investment objectives "Small Company Growth," "Other Aggressive Growth," "Growth," "Growth and Income," "Income,"
"Maximum Capital Gains," and "Balanced." 7 We exclude international funds and index funds as well as all bond and money market funds. We further exclude all funds which invest less than 50% in US equities. We do so because the CRSP US Stock database only includes return information on US stocks. Our final sample includes We define all years according to whether we expect compensation or employment incentives to be the main driver of managerial behavior. Our proxy for the relative importance of these two incentives is the stock market return which is calculated as the value-weighted index of all securities that are traded at the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Compensation incentives are assumed to be more important if the midyear market return is positive (bull markets) and employment incentives are assumed to be more important if the midyear market return is negative (bear markets), respectively.
We use midyear market returns rather than end of year market returns since the fund managers do not know the end of year market return when they decide about changing risk at the middle of the year. Using this procedure, we classify the years 1982, 1984, 1992, 1994, 2000, 2001 and 2002 as those in which employment incentives are more important and all other years as ones in which compensation incentives are more important. 8 Information on midyear and end of year market returns is provided in the last two columns of Table 1 . In 19 of 24 years, end of year and midyear market returns are of the same signs. Thus, it appears reasonable to assume that fund managers use midyear market returns as a proxy for end of year market returns and eventually the relative importance of employment and compensation incentives, respectively.
Construction of the Intended Risk Taking Variable
While most previous papers analyze the risk taking behavior of mutual funds using fund return data (e.g., Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; Koski and Pontiff, 1999;  Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2003), we use information about the portfolio holdings of mutual funds. 9 Analyzing the risk taking behavior of fund managers using portfolio holdings allows us to examine the fund manager's intended rather than the realized change in risk. This is a more exact measure of the fund manager's reaction to the incentives she faces than the realized change in risk. The reason for this is that looking at realized changes in risk does not allow us to distinguish between intended changes in risk and unexpected changes in risk due to changes in the risk of the stocks in the portfolio (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) . Intended risk changes can deviate substantially from realized changes in fund risk because risk changes of stocks affect the change of funds' volatility dramatically (Busse, 2001 ).
For each fund and year, we compute the intended portfolio risk for the second half of the year, , based on the actual portfolio weights in the second half of the year and the expected stock volatility in the second half of the year. We use the volatility of a stock in the first half of the year as estimator for expected stock volatility in the second half of the year.
(2),int it σ To calculate the intended risk changes, we have to relate the intended risk in the second half of the year, , to the realized risk in the first half of the year,
Realized portfolio risk in the first half of the year is calculated using the actual portfolio holdings in the first half of the year and the realized stock volatility in the same period. Details pertaining to the calculation of these risk figures are provided in Appendix B.
There are two common approaches to calculate risk changes suggested in the literature: in one, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) capture the change in portfolio risk of a manager by the risk adjustment ratio. 10 We adopt their idea and define the intended risk adjustment ratio as the intended risk in the second half of the year, , divided by the realized risk in the first half of the year,
. 10 Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) do not use holdings data and define as the ratio of the realized risk in the second part of the year and the realized risk in the first part of the year where both figures are calculated based on return data.
RAR
Alternatively, Koski and Pontiff (1999) suggest capturing changes in risk by the difference in fund risk. 11 We compute the intended risk change as the difference between intended portfolio risk in the second half of the year and realized risk in the first half of the year:
Employment and Compensation Incentives as Drivers of Risk Taking
We test whether risk taking behavior depends on the relative importance of compensation and employment incentives (Hypotheses 1 and 2). We use two approaches to analyze the risk taking behavior of fund managers. First, we apply a contingency table approach (Section 2.1). This approach is a very simple nonparametric test of managerial risk taking behavior. Second, we apply a regression approach (Section 2.2). This parametric approach allows us to examine easily Hypothesis 3 on the impact of the strength of the incentives on risk taking (Section 2.3) and to control for the influence of further variables that might be related to risk taking (Section 3).
Contingency Table Approach
According to our Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2), we expect the intended risk adjustment ratio, it RAR , for midyear losers to be larger (smaller) than that for midyear winners when compensation (employment) incentives dominate. To define funds as midyear losers, we calculate the rank of fund i in the first half of year t as compared to the other funds in the same segment, denoted by . This captures the fund's midyear performance. Ranks are calculated for each segment and each year separately. They are based on raw returns and are normalized to be equally distributed between 0 and 1, with the best fund in its respective segment getting assigned the rank number 1.
( In Panel B we compute the cell frequencies for each individual year in our sample. In 17 of 24 cases, the results confirm our Hypotheses 1 and 2: Midyear losers have a significantly higher probability of increasing risk than midyear winners if compensation incentives are more important. In contrast, midyear losers have a significant lower probability of increasing risk than midyear winners if employment incentives are more important.
For illustration, in Panel C we also present results for the whole sample. In this case, the null hypothesis of identical cell frequencies can not be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. Given our findings from above, this is not surprising.
Compensation and employment incentives tend to offset each other in the whole sample. This indicates that not distinguishing between periods in which compensation incentives are more important and periods in which employment incentives are more important can yield misleading results.
Regression Approach
We now examine the risk taking behavior of fund managers by applying a regression approach. While the contingency table approach presented above only allows for a distinction between midyear winners and midyear losers, the regression approach allows us to examine the impact of the fund's rank in a continuous way. We choose a dummy approach to test whether the risk taking of a fund depends on the relative strength of compensation incentives and employment incentives. We estimate the following model:
.
The dependent variable, We find similar results if we use intended RARs instead of the intended risk differences as a dependent variable in our regressions. We report findings for the latter, as this allows us to compare results directly to studies using the regression approach like Koski and Pontiff (1999 In Panel B of Table 3 we present estimation results of the rank coefficients for yearly regressions of a basic version of Model (2):
(2),int
In 17 out of 24 cases, we find significant estimates in the expected direction: the rank coefficient is significantly negative in bull markets and significantly positive in bear markets, i.e., midyear losers increase risk more than midyear winners if compensation incentives are more important and vice versa if employment incentives are more important.
Our findings are consistent with the results of Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) . They find no difference pertaining to risk taking between midyear winners and midyear losers for the period from 1980 to 1985, but find more risk taking of midyear losers than of midyear winners for the period from 1986 to 1991. Panel B shows that the number of years in which compensation incentives dominate and in which employment incentives dominate is roughly equal in the first period, while compensation incentives clearly dominate in the second period. This is a possible explanation of the temporal instability of the results on risk taking behavior in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) .
Other studies that do not differentiate between periods of strong and weak employment and compensation incentives, respectively, also find contradictory results. Only a few studies address the temporal instability with respect to the influence of the segment rank on risk taking behavior. Kempf and Ruenzi (2002) find that midyear losers increase risk more than midyear winners before 1996, and vice versa from 1997 onwards. 16 This result can also be explained by compensations incentives dominating in the earlier period and employment incentives dominating in the latter period.
For illustration, in Panel C of Table 3 we also report estimation results of Model (3) for the whole sample. The coefficient on the influence of the rank is virtually zero, when we estimate its impact without distinguishing between periods in which employment incentives and in which compensation incentives, respectively, are more important. It is significant neither in statistical nor in economic terms. This result again confirms that not distinguishing between periods in which employment incentives and in which compensation incentives, respectively, are more important, can easily yield misleading results.
Influence of the Strength of the Incentives
Up to this point, we only classify the years in our sample according to whether we expect compensation or employment incentives to dominate. According to Hypothesis 3, not only the direction but also the strength of the incentives matter. If the market shows a very strong upward movement, compensation incentives might be stronger than if the market is only slightly bullish. The very good performance of the market attracts investors' attention and their desire to participate in future gains, while moderately positive returns have less such effect. A similar argument can be made with respect to employment incentives. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between the midyear return of the market as reported in Table 1 
where we relate the estimated coefficients from yearly estimations of Model (3) (see Panel B of This supports our Hypothesis 3: the more extreme the return of the market, the more pronounced is the impact of rank on risk taking. These results are consistent with the idea that compensation incentives are the more important, the more bullish the market is, and that employment incentives are the more important, the more bearish the market is.
Additional Drivers of Risk Taking
In this section we investigate the impact of additional factors that might influence our main results. Specifically, we examine whether our results are stable if we take into account how fund managers respond to risk surprises (Section 3.1) and if we control for the impact of fund characteristics as well as segment and family fixed effects and fund individual random effects, respectively (Section 3.2).
Impact of Risk Surprises
One important factor likely to influence a fund manager's risk taking behavior is unexpected risk realizations. Fund managers might counterbalance unexpected risk realizations by adjusting their portfolio risk. To examine this hypothesis we extend Model (2) by adding the risk surprise in the first half of the year as explanatory variable. The risk surprise is calculated as the difference between the realized risk in the first half of the year and the intended risk in the first half of the year: .
Similarly as in Section 1.2, intended risk in the first half of the year is calculated using the realized weights in the first half of the year, but volatilities from the second half of the previous year. The model now reads: 
We expect fund managers to respond to the risk surprise in the first half of the year, , by adjusting their risk accordingly in the second half of the year, i.e., we expect a negative coefficient c. This model allows us to examine whether our main result is influenced by the reaction of fund managers to risk surprises. Table 4 summarizes the estimation results of Model (5).
(1) 
The coefficient captures the additional impact if the risk surprise is positive compared to the base case of a negative risk surprise. Estimation results are presented in the last column of Table 4 .
We find that fund managers only counterbalance risk surprises if they face a higher than expected risk realization; they do not react upon surprisingly low risk realizations. This suggests that risk limits play an important role in determining risk changing behavior of fund managers. Still, our main results are not affected by taking these effects into account.
Impact of Fund Characteristics
We now analyze whether our findings are robust with regard to the influence of individual fund, family and segment characteristics. Wermers, 2000; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2007) find a strong influence of the realized risk in the first half of the year and the median of the risk changes of all funds in the same segment on managerial risk taking, we add additional explanatory variables in our regression.
(2),int (1) t t σ σ − is the intended risk change of the median fund in the segment 17 Alternatively, we also estimate Model (6) for subsamples of funds with specific characteristics. Subsamples are formed based on whether the size, age, turnover, expenses or family size are above or below the median values of the whole sample, and according to their load-status, the numbers of share classes they offer, and to the investment objective they belong to. Generally, our results (not reported) show only minor variations in the level of the rank coefficients. All rank coefficients are of the expected sign and remain significant at the one percent level. Results are robust independent of the subgroup considered. Our results concerning the influence of the risk surprise are also stable with respect to different fund characteristics.
the fund belongs to, and
σ is the realized risk of the fund in the first part of the year.
Estimation results of Model (7) are summarized in Table 5 .
-Please insert Koski and Pontiff (1999) and Daniel and Wermers (2000) . The influence of the median of the intended risk changes of all funds in the same segment is significantly positive which agrees with the findings of Kempf and Ruenzi (2007) .
To control for differences between the various segments and families that funds belong to, we also estimate Model (7) with segment fixed effects (see Column 3 of Table 5 ) and with segment and family fixed effects (see Column 4 of Table 5 ), respectively. Adding segment fixed effects and family fixed effects changes none of our main results. Finally, instead of including family fixed effects, we also estimate the model with individual random effects (see Column 5 of Table 5 ). Still, our main results remain unaffected.
Overall, the findings in Section 3 suggest that our results on the influence of employment incentives and compensation incentives on risk taking are not driven by the response of fund managers to risk surprises, individual fund characteristics, or the funds' segment or family affiliation.
Conclusion
Mutual fund managers face various incentives that have an impact on their risk taking.
While compensation incentives arising from the convex performance flow relationship are studied in great detail (e.g., Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2003) , there is only little evidence on the impact of employment risk on risk taking. In this paper, we jointly examine compensation incentives and employment incentives.
Using data on portfolio holdings of US equity mutual funds and stock returns from Our results are not driven by fund characteristics or the reaction of managers to unexpected risk realization. We find that managers counterbalance risk surprises only if realized risk is higher than initially planned. This is consistent with the idea that fund managers face risk limits they must not or do not want to exceed by the end of the year. However, our main results are not affected by this response to risk surprises.
Gaining a better understanding of the incentives driving fund managers' behavior is important for fund investors and fund companies, as these incentives can lead to adverse managerial behavior. As Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) point out, risk adjustment of fund managers as a response to compensation incentives is not optimal for fund investors. The same is true for risk adjustments due to employment incentives. They are not aimed at building a portfolio with optimal risk-return characteristics from the fund investor's point of view and create additional trading costs, which eventually hurts performance (Bagnoli and Watts, 2000; Li and Tiwari, 2006) . James and Isaac (2000) show that risk changes due to such incentives can even lead to inefficient price formation in asset markets and might thus be of some interest from a regulatory point of view.
Perhaps the most important implication of our study for future research on managerial risk taking is that temporal variations of compensation and employment incentives should not be neglected. Our findings suggest that ignoring such variations can easily deliver misleading results and eventually lead to erroneous conclusions. We think that our results not only hold for managers of mutual funds, but also might have important implications for the behavior of managers of corporations in general. In the corporate world the business cycle might play a role similar to the role played by bull and bear markets in the mutual fund industry. For example, it is likely that employment risk is only a minor concern for managers in a boom period, while it might seriously impact their decisions in a recession. We think that analyzing the impact of business cycles on the incentives corporate managers face offers an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix A: Matching Process
We start our merging procedure by matching the stocks from the CRSP US Stock database with the holdings data from the Thomson Financial database based on the stocks' CUSIP identifier. To match the holdings data from Thomson Financial and the mutual fund data from CRSP we first aggregate multiple share classes of the same fund in the CRSP data as in Wermers (2000) . Then, the aggregated CRSP fund data are matched with the Thomson Financial fund data. There is no unique common identifier used in both databases for the whole time period. Only since 1999 have both CRSP and Thomson Financial provided ticker data. Therefore, we initially match the databases using ticker data for the years 1999 to 2003 and extrapolate the match for the prior years. The procedure is similar to the one used by Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) . Beginning in 1975, we then consider the funds' names for our matching
process. An algorithm which identifies identical strings and abbreviations is applied. This is necessary, because the CRSP database comprises a 50-character text field for the funds' names, while Thomson Financial provides a 25-character text field. Finally, we check the validity of this matching procedure by comparing total net assets and investment objective information from both data sources for the matched funds.
Appendix B: Calculation of Intended and Realized Risk
Information about the portfolio holdings is available quarterly or semi-annually. We assume that funds change their holdings only once between the report dates. For the remaining time, we assume that the number of shares held by the fund remains constant. Portfolio holdings are adjusted for stock splits. We first compute the realized risk of the funds' portfolios in the first half of the year,
(1) it σ , based on 26 weekly portfolio returns.
To compute the intended risk of the funds' portfolio in the second half of the year, , we calculate 26 hypothetical portfolio returns based on holdings information from the second half of the year and on stock returns from the first half of the year.
This gives us a weekly portfolio return time series. is defined as the volatility of this portfolio return time series. Using the same method as above, we also compute the intended risk in the first half of the year, .
(2),int it
Relationship between the Rank Coefficient and the Midyear Market Return
We plot the midyear market returns as well as the coefficient of the different years from Model (3):
The return observations are taken from Column 6 of Table 1 and the coefficients from Column 2 of Panel B of Table 3 . The observations are sorted in ascending order based on the midyear return of the market. 1982 1984 2001 1994 1992 2000 1990 1981 1993 1980 1996 1999 2003 1988 1998 1991 1989 1997 1985 1995 1986 1983 1987 Year Table 2 Intended Risk Taking and Employment and Compensation Incentives: Contingency Table Approach This table reports the frequency of funds allocated to each of four cells in a 2 x 2 contingency table. The cells refer to different combinations of funds that are midyear winners/midyear losers based on their rank in the first half of the year and of funds with a risk adjustment ratio (RAR) below/above the median fund in the first half of the year. The risk adjustment ratio is defined as:
The null hypothesis for the χ 2 -tests is that the percentage in each cell is 25% which means that the status of a fund as midyear winner/midyear loser has no influence on RAR. The p-value is based on the standard χ 2 -test. Panel A shows the results for subsamples of years in which we expect compensation incentives to dominate and in which we expect employment incentives to dominate. Panel B shows the same results separately for each year from 1980 to 2003 and Panel C for the whole sample. In all Panels, ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
In these models, is the rank of fund i in its segment based on raw returns in the first half of year t. In Model (2), ( 
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In these models, is the rank of fund i in its segment based on raw returns in the first half of year t. ( 
In this model, is the rank of fund i in its segment based on raw returns in the first half of year t. ( and ln are the natural logarithm of fund total net assets and fund age, respectively, is a dummy indicating the load status of fund i which takes on the value one if any of the share classes of the fund charges a load, and zero otherwise, and are the expense ratio and the turnover ratio of fund i, respectively, and is a dummy that takes on the value one if the fund is a multiple-share class fund, and zero otherwise. 
